Central Banks, Bubbles, and Productivity



General Outline

- An overview of the difference between inflation targeting, NGDP targeting, and a Taylor Rule;
- An argument as to why NGDP targeting generally makes more sense;
- An argument to the effect that inflation targeting is particularly dangerous, because central bas that practice it can end up fueling unsustainable assetmarket booms.
- Empirical evidence supporting the last argument

Conventional Assessment of Alternative Targets

Loss Function: $L = \alpha (y_{t} - y_{n})^{2} + \beta (\pi_{t} - \pi^{*})^{2}$ $\beta > \alpha$: More weight on inflation tan output $\beta < \alpha$: More weight on output tan inflation

Alternative Monetary Targets

Simple Inflation Target: α = ο Taylor Rule: α and β > ο NGDP Growth Rate: β = ο

Rational for Inflation Targeting

- Changes in P are ultimate cause of differences between y_t and y_n Prices are Sticky (M-disequilibrium) Prices are Flexible (Signal Extraction Problem)
- So, output loss automatically avoided

Inflation Targeting and NGDP Targeting 1

Stable NGDP is equivalent to maintaining a stable level (or growth rate) of Aggregate Demand



Fixed LRAS: Inflation Targeting and NGDP Targeting Equivalent



Changing LRAS: Inflation Targeting and NGDP Targeting *not* **Equivalent**



NGDP Stability Dominates Price Stability

- Signal Extraction: Since they can have only one cause, meaning of price changes is unambiguous.
 Sticky Prices:
 - Prices respond quickly to underlying changes in unit cost
 - Either output or input prices must change, depending on whether AD remains stable or not; and output prices tend to be less sticky than input prices
- P stabilization in presence of productivity innovations itself results in suboptimal output movements.

What happens if the central bank insists on targeting P (or rate of inflation) despite a surge of productivity?

- For simplicity, assume that labor and y_t = A_t(N_t), where A is productivity. Let w = nominal wage rate. As A increases, so does equilibrium real wage, w/P.
- Price-level targeting requires higher AD and w in respone to positive A shock.
- With sticky wages, w/P doesn't adjust at once to new equilibrium. Result is short-run "profit inflation." Signal extraction problem prevents temporary nature of enhanced profits from being recognized
- Asset prices reflect discounted expected future profits.

Inflation targeting, productivity, and booms 1



Inflation targeting, productivity, and booms 2



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Inflation targeting, productivity, and booms 3



A Simple Natural Rate Model

$$r^n = -\ln(\beta) + \sigma g + n$$

where

- rⁿ is the "natural" rate of interest;
- β is the time discount factor;
- G is the total-factor productivity growth rate; and
- n is the growth rate of the labor force.

The Productivity Gap



The Productivity Gap and Housing Starts



Representative Quotes from the December 2003 FOMC Transcript

- "We believe we can enter [2006] with a belowequilibrium funds rate and still not generate any acceleration of inflation until later"
- "Faster productivity growth...could put further downward pressure on prices...Partly for this reason, the shift in the balance of risks...does not call for a change in policy any time soon...we should continue to take our risks on the easy side of policy."

A Longer View



The Productivity Gap and the Output Gap

$$\widehat{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (r_{t+i}^A - \overline{r}^n - \sigma \widehat{g}_{t+i}).$$



NGDP Targeting and Taylor Rule

Taylor Rule a compromise between inflation and NGDP targeting. Attaches some weight to departures of y from y_n , and some to departures of P from P*. But precisely because it still treats P movements as inherently "bad," it is in fact inferior to NGDP targeting, which seeks to prevent AD from influencing P, without interfering with P movements based on supply (and especially productivity) innovations.

The Productivity Gap and the Taylor Rule



